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THE APPLICATION OF JUS SANGUINIS DURING POST-COLONIAL 
STATE CREATION AND THE INCEPTION OF STATELESSNESS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF KENYA AND TANZANIA. 
Abstract 
Among the reasons why Afi·icans are leji without a nationality is the colonial history of their 
respective states. Following the attainment of independence, these newly independent A_fi-ican 
states had to grapple with thejormulation of citizenship laws that would apply to political units 
comprising of people .from d~(ferent cultures, religions and languages. In a bid to achieve this, 
governments had to decide whether to grant citizenship on the basis of the la.,v of descent Ous 
sanguinis) or the law of the soil Ous soli). 
The general objective a_( this paper is to investigate the motivations that would lead a state to 
choose either mode 4 granting citizenship as well as its resultant effect on the creation of 
statelessness. It will additionally look into the net/ion-building processes of Kenya and 
Tanzania, which apply jus sanguinis and jus soli respectively, as well as their citizenship 
policies before and after the altainment a_( independence. This examination hopes to eventually 
determine whether these policies. from the point of state succession, have lived up to the 
obligation to grant nationality to persons within their territories and prevent the occurrence 
of statelessness. 
CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1.1 Background 
A stateless person is a person who is not considered a national by any state under the operation 
of its law. 1 Statelessness bas been deemed a by-product of nation-building in Europe in the 19th 
century2. After the First and Second World War, the nation-building process defined the state 
as a homogenous entity. Therefore, being part of a state meant possessing the correct 
nationality that was additionally verifiable through proper documentation. Those who had been 
displaced as a result of the war, deportation or other means during the two wars subsequently 
lost their formal state affiliation. 3 
In Africa particularly, statelessness carne about as a result of the creation of states after the 
attainment of independence. African leaders had to work through the nation-building agenda 
in political units comprising of people from different cultures, religions and languages. The 
registration of births and documentation of population was therefore discriminatory. 4 Anyone 
who did not belong to the same societa l structure as his or her counterparts was denied 
nationality. Additionally, state succession laws with respect to citizenship left behind by the 
colonial powers were qu ite unclear in some regions . For instance, the French left the whole 
process up to the new governments with oo guidance or documentation to aid the process. 5 
This rudimentary fom1 of nation-building led to the occurrence of populations without a 
nationality. 
The right to nationality has been described as a person's basic right; it is nothing less than the 
right to have rights. 6 Statelessness can therefore be seen as a violation ofthis right7and a failure 
on the part of states to meet their obligation to grant nationality to persons within their 
territories and prevent the occurrence of statelessness. 8 It is additionally a prerequisite to the 
exposure to human rights abuses. Even in the poorest countries, a passport or identity card 
1 Article I, Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 28 September 1954, vol. 360, UNTS I 17. 
2 Rurup M, Lives in Limbo: Statelessness after two World Wars, German Historical Institute, 2013, 113. 
> Rurup M, Lives in Limbo. 11 3. 
4 Manby B. Statelessness in Africa: The scale o.f the challenge and the opporlllnities .for leadership 
http://www.statclessness.eu/blog/slatclessness-afi-ica-scalc-challenge-and-opponunitics-leadership accessed on 
13th January, 20 17. 
s Man by B, Statelessness in Afi'ica: http://ww\\ .statelt:ssness.culblo!!/statele~sness-n fiica-scale-challengc-and-
opportunities-leadership accessed on 13th January, 2017. 
6 Weissbrodt D and Collins C, 'The human rights of stateless persons' 28 Human Rights Quarterly (2006) 248 
7 Article 15, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. 
3 Article I & 2, the Convention on the Reduction a,( Statelessness, 30 August 1961. 
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does not just provide the right to travel but forms the basis of the right to almost everything 
else."9 Persons not tied to a particular state are unable to access healthcare, enrol their children 
in schools, own property, vote or even work for the government. Stateless communities are 
among the world's most vulnerable populations and the study of the creation and possible 
alleviation of this phenomenon is vital. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
The extent to which the world is blighted by statelessness is an indication that it is a problem 
worthy of detailed research. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates 
that there are over I 0 million stateless persons in the world. 10 Having established that states 
have an obligation to grant nationality to persons legally deserving of it and that there is an 
expressly provided right to nationality that is recognised internationally, there is evidently a 
magnificent inconsistency between the Jaw and practice. 
Most importantly, it is evident that the laws and practices that governed citizenship in many 
African countries at the point of state succession, effectively left hundreds of thousands of 
people without a nationality. 11 This paper seeks to investigate the probable causes ofthis defect 
by studying the app lkation of the jus soli and jus sanguinis modes of granting citizenship and 
the motivations that lead states to adopt either. There is an overwhelming need to understand 
why African states adopted and are continuing to adopt either of the two modes as well as the 
impact of the same on statelessness. 
1.3 Research Hypothesis 
Countries that grant citizenship through the application ofthe law of the soil have less issues 
of statelessness as compared to those that grant citizenship through the application of the law 
of descent. 
9 Bronwen Manby, Citizenship the most important right of all, 
llflp://a{rictmarguments.Cirg/2009/ /0/ /1/dti::emhip-the-mnsl-imnorlant-right-o(-u/11 on August 15, 2017. 
10 This is an estimated figure. Due to gaps in the collection of data by governments, the UN and civil society, a 
full breakdown of this figure is beyond reach. Van Waas Land Chickera D, The World's Stateless: a new report 
on why size does and doesn't matter.http://www.stntclcssness.eu/blog/world%E2%80%99s-stateless-new-
report-why-size-docs-and-doesn%E2%80%99t-multcr accessed on 14th January, 2017. 
11 Manby B, Citizenship law in Africa: A comparative study, Open Society Foundations, New York, 20l0, J. 
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1.4 Statement of Objectives 
This paper seeks to meet the following objectives: 
1. To analyse the concept of nationality in Africa pre-independence, during and post-
independence. 
2. To fmd out the historical, political or legal motivations that lead Kenya and Tanzania 
adopt the jus sanguinis or jus soli modes of granting citizenship respectively. 
3. To analyse the intensity of statelessness in countries with the jus sangunis principle as 
against those with the jus soli principle; a comparative study ofKenya and Tanzania. 
4. To critique the recent recognition of the Makoude and Kenyan-Asians by the Kenyan 
government and Burundian refugees in Tanzania. 
5. To highlight the possible solutions or policy changes that would be best suited for a 
country plagued with statelessness because of its operation of the law of descent or law 
of the soil. 
1.5 Research Questions 
] . What was the nature and scope of a state 's obligation to grant nationality to persons 
residing within its teiTitory at the point of state creation? 
2. What factors would influence a state's decision on whether to abolish the appJjcation 
of jus soli in their citizenship laws despite the fact that it may be the primary mode of 
eradicating statelessness? 
3. Has Tanzania successfully dealt with the prob lem of statelessness by virtue of applying 
jus soli and is there an effective legal course of action to deal with cases of statelessness 
if and when they arise? 
4. Based on the observations made in research questions (3) and (4), how can the s ituation 
i:n Kenya be critiqued? 
1.6 Justification of the Study 
The findings of this study will highlight the post-colonial transition of Afl-ican states 
pai1icularly, Kenya and Tanzania, from their colonial authorities and the legal problems that 
arose in determining the content of their national laws on citizenship. 
It will also shed light on the creation of statelessness in Africa as linked to colonial history and 
eventual enactment and application of citizenship laws by the newly fanned and independent 
govemments. 
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Additionally, it will provide a complete understanding of the nature and content of the positive 
obligations of states when it comes to the reduction of statelessness. One such obligation being 
policy changes under citizenship law. Given that this paper concentrates largely on 
statelessness brought about by the technicalities of citizenship laws, it may inform the possible 
policy changes that may be applicable to the reduction of statelessness while still maintaining 
the reserved domain of the states on nationality matters. 12 
This paper seeks to prove the suitability of introducing a change in citizenship laws in Africa 
by looking at Kenya and Tanzania who apply jus sanguinis and jus soli respectively. It will in 
turn compare the extent of statelessness in both countries as well as the legal and political 
environment in respect of remedies for the stateless and its eventual alleviation. This will serve 
as concrete evidence of the proposed changes. 
1.7 Theoretical Framework 
This research wi ll integrate the ethics of African Citizenship and the theory ofthc ideal African 
state according to Mwalimu Julius Nyerere. It will look into his nation-building approach after 
Tanganyika attained independence in order to substantiate the need fo r granting stateless 
persons a right to a nationality. Statelessness has often been linked to political rcstmcturing 
fo llowing state succession13 which was the case for most African countries after they gained 
their independence. These fanner colonial territories had to grapple with the task of 
determining who wou ld make up the human capital of their states by enacting nationa l laws 
tl1at would clarify and determine citizenship. 14 Tanzania however followed a different 
historical path when it came to nation-building. At a time when hatred for foreigners was at its 
peak, Julius Nyerere rejected Africanization and racially- based citizenship and pushed for 
inclusive citizenship policies. 15 This is evident, for example, in the treatment of Asians in 
Kenya as against those in Tanzania. Despite a lot of hatred towards the Asians, the independent 
12Tite Pem1ancn1 Court of lntemational Justice described the grant of nationality being within the "reserved 
domain of the states" which was later upheld in the Nollebohm case. TI1c court in this instance described 
nationality as being within the domestic jurisdiction of the state which settles, by its own legislation, the rules 
relating to the acquisi tion of its nationality. AdviSOIJ' Opinion No. 4. Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and 
Morocco, 4, Permanent Court of international Justice, 7 February 1923: Notlebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. 
Guatemala); Second Phase. International Court of Justice (ICJ). 6 April I 955. 
13 Blitz B. and Lynch M, Statelessness and citizenship: A comparc1til·e study on the bene:fits o./"nationality, Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited, 20 I I, 3. 
14 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, The Right to Nationality in Africa, published by the 
Afiican Commission on 1-luman and Peoples' Rights, 2015, 8. 
15 Aminzade R., Race, Nation. and Citizenship in Postcolonial Africa: The Case of Tanzania. Cambridge 
University Press, 2013, 18. 
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states did not produce the same patterns of exclusion. Tanzania made it possible, through the 
enactment of inclusive c itizenship laws, for foreigners that had been residents of Tanzania to 
obtain citizenship. The Asians in Kenya on the other hand were rendered stateless by law. 16 ln 
addition to the discussion of the ideal state according to Nyerere, this paper will assess how 
Tanganyika transitioned into Tanzania as well as the progression of their citizenship laws. 
Finally, this theory will argue out whether the Nyererian approach could have been the most 
effective mode of state creation with regards to initial prevention and eventual reduction of 
statelessness. 
1.8 Assumptions 
That there will be no fundamental change in the citizenship laws of both countries prior to the 
completion of the study. 
For the purposes of this study, citizenship and nationality shall be used interchangeably as in 
contemporary usage to refer to the legal relationship between an individual and a state, in which 
the state recognises and guarantees the individua l's rights. 17 
1.9 Research Methodology 
The primary source of information was the available literature on the topic. This included: 
relevant legislation, authoritative publications, principles of common law, case law, news 
sources, the Hansards of Kenya and Tanzania, commission reports and text books. 
16 Aminzade R., Rae". Nation. and Citizenship in Postcolonial Africa: The Cas" of Tanzania. 115. 
17 Manby B, Citizenship law in Africa: A comparative study. Open Society Foundations, New York, 20 l 0, ix. 
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CHAPTER2 
MWALIMU J ULIUS NYERERE'S IDEAL AFRICAN STATE: THE MAKING OF 
TANZANIA 
2.1 Introduction 
'Start the st01y with the failure of the African state, and not with the colonial creation of the 
African state, and you have an entirely different st01y. '18 
The reasons why Africans are left without a nationality are often linked to: the colonial history 
of their respective states, state borders, population migrations on the continent, structural 
discrimination in African societies and difficulties affecting the movements of cross- border 
and nomadic populations. 19 This paper seeks to particularly interrogate statelessness as a result 
of state succession and the formation of new citizenship laws after the attainment of 
independence. Africa's colonial history resulted in the rules governing the transition to 
independence particularly sensitive in the context of citizenship law. Most cases of individuals 
or groups deprived of citizenship relate to the status of those who were recognised as colonial 
subjects but whose presence was resented by the origina l inhabitants of the regions whose 
borders were altered during the colonial period. These cases also include the determination of 
the status of persons whose parents came from another part of a conunon colonial territory and 
migrated as part of colonial policy.20 This chapter will theorise in particular, the making of 
independent Tanzania as was spearheaded by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere. 
Following the attainment of independence, African states were charged with the duty to 
determine the content of national laws on citizenship. This was necessary for the purpose of 
catering for the mixed populations that were present due to the large-scale migrations and 
arbitrary border delineation that had taken place during the colonial period and providing a 
legal process that would determine the nationality of persons born after independence. 21 The 
legal problems that consequently arose included a determination of who would make up the 
human capital of the successor states and the recognition of persons who lacked a nationality 
18Adichie C., The danger of a single story TED Talk at 
http://www.tco.com/talks/chimamanda adichie the danger of' n single story.hltnl on 30 January 2018. 
19Afiican Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, The Righ11o Nalionality in Africa, African Commission 
on Human and Peoples ' Rights, 2015, 5. 
20 Manby B, Citizenship law in Africa: A comparative study, Open Society Foundations, New York, 2010, 21. 
21 ACmHPR, The Right to Nationality in Africa, 21. 
7 
prior to colonial annexation.22 National legislation was therefore necessary to cater for the new 
realities that followed the accession of Afi·ican states to international sovereignty. 
Statelessness in Africa can be attributed to the political restructuring that independent African 
states were taking part in, in the form of new citizenshjp laws and administrative processes. 23 
These transitional ru les, in practice, granted nationality at1tomatically to some people, and 
created rights to opt for others, but omitted to create a right to nationality for some categories 
ofpeople altogether.24 Certain pieces oflegislation were also discriminatory on the grounds of 
ethnic origins, race, descent and colour and thus made it difficult for cer1ain groups of people 
to acquire the nationality of a certain country despite having strong ties to it. 25 Man by notes for 
instance, the extreme examples ofLiberia and Siena Leone who despite being formed by freed 
slaves, take the position that only those of"negro descent" can acquire citizenship from birth. 26 
It is important to note, however, that not all African states went down this path, an example 
being the case ofTanzania and the exceptional approach taken by Ju lius Nyerere. 
2.2 An African Ethos of Citizenship 
Oche Onazi argues that the legal, social and political composition or institutions of any society 
(especially its concept of citizenship) should be reflective of its traditional moral values and 
that there is a concept of citizenship with distinct African characteristics that ought to have 
informed the creation of citizenship Jaws following the attainrnent of independence and state 
succession. 27 Onazi also affll1Us that the inherited notions of citizenship from the former 
colonial masters is what prevents all Africans from tnlly belonging, except in geographical 
locations where they can unproblematically trace their tribal or ethnic origins. 28 Legislation 
stemming !Tom such thinking only further concretizes and preserves this colonial legacy29 
22 ACmHPR, The Right to Nationality in Aji·ica, 21. 
23 Blitz B. and Lynch M, Statelessness and citizenship: A comparatil·e study on the benefits of nationality. 20 II. 
21. 
24 ACmHPR. The Right to Nationality in Africtl. 21 . 
zs ACMHPR, The Right to Nationality in Africa, 21. See also, the importance of genuine and effective links 
whether in the fom1 of habitual residence, family ties, participation in public life or the attachment to a country 
in considering whether or not to grant citizenship as emphasized in the Nollebohm Case {Liechtenstein v. 
Guatemala); Second Phase, lntemational Courr of Justice (ICJ), 6 April 1955. 
26 Manby B, Citizenship law in Africa. 3. 
27 Oche 0, Beyond Rights and Responsibilities: An Aji-ican Ethos of Citizenship, in Afi-ican Legal TheOJ}' and 
Co111empor01y Problems: Critical Essays. Springer, volume 29, 2014, I 69. 
2M Oche 0 , An African Ethos of Citizenship. 2014, 169. 
29 Mamood Mamdani described the indigene and settler dichotomy as one of the continuing colonial legacies in 
Africa. For him, the indigene and settler dichotomy cannot be sufficiently grasped and resolved without 
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instead of refashioning the idea of citizenship to one that is suitable to Africa contextually. 
What then did it mean to be a citizen or to h·uly belong in precolonial Africa? 
Oche postulates that there is a type of ethical life implied in being a citizen over and above it 
being about rights and responsibilities. Citizenship is additionally about a set of moral values 
required in order to act responsibly in relation to others and that it provides an appropriate 
context for encouraging societal connectedness, collective flourishing and belonging. 30 
However, citizenship has been reduced largely to the extens ion of rights to members of a 
political community without looking to the resultant responsibilities. Rights are more about 
claims and what is owed to you by a1JOther as opposed to responsibilities which spark some 
sort of interpersonal relationship between persons.-'' Citizenship should therefore be viewed as 
a right as well as a responsibility to persons in conununity. It is evident that for Oche, the 
African notion of citizenship is centred around the human being as an individual as well as a 
person in community and that these two need not be mutua lly exclusive. 
Oche then goes on to delineate five distinct characteristics32 of an African inspired concept of 
citizenship founded on African jurisprudence as follows: 
The focus on all dimensions of human relationships by African jurisprudence thus 
underscoring the importance of societa l moral values. Humans are relational beings and 
this implies a certain moral disposition as part oftbe process ofsocietalliving.33 
The focus on all dimensions of human relationships which implies that, all human 
beings, regardless of territorial boundaries, culture, ethnicity or religion, are morally 
responsible to each other. Such an understanding provides us with an opportunity to 
learn to transcend national, local, ethn ic, religious and other group loya lties.34 
The African jurispmdential concept of citizenship docs not only focus on humanity in 
all of its glory and perfect ion but also, vulnerability and suffering. This concept 
historicising it. See Mamdani M, Beyond selfler and native as political identities: overcoming 1he political 
legacy of colonialism. Comp Stud Soc Hist, 200 I, 43( 4) 65 1-664. 
10 Oche 0 , An Afi-ican Ethos qf Citizenship.l 69. 
31 Oche 0 , An African Ethos o.f Citizenship, 169. 
32 Oche 0 , An African Ethos q( Citizenship, 166 - 168. 
33 Oche 0 , An African Ethos of Citizenship, 167. 
34 Oche 0 , An African Ethos of Citizenship, 167. 
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appreciates that all human beings, including the most powerful, are vulnerable to 
suffering. 35 
The idea of responsibilities, and how they are pivotal to nurturing the kind of moral 
values that are imp01tant for collective flourishing. Responsibilities from an Arrican 
jurisprudential point of view implies the proper grasp of human responsibilities and not 
only makes citizenship moral, but also socialises it by aligning all human beings within 
a given community together. Citizenship then becomes dependent on community as 
opposed to statehood.36 
Citizenship is dependent on and can only be cu ltivated throug h daily relationships, 
interactions and encounters between human beings. The ethical life implied by being 
an African citizen is gauged by asking what it means to be good to others?37 Benezet 
Bujo noted that it is exactly the community which enables the self-realisation of the 
individual. lt is therefore not possible to achieve the ethica l ideal individually or as a 
strictly personal achievement. 3!1 
2.3 Nation-building in Tanzania 
As was earlier mentioned, Tanzania followed a different path when it came to nation-building 
with respect to citizenship laws. The approach taken by Tanzania at the time was the 
thoroughfare less travelled and Oche's ethos of African citizenship, in retrospect, seems to 
have been inspired by Nyerere's ideals. It can be argued that Nyerere's contribution and the 
failure of the rest of the African leaders, was to build Tanzania as the ethical community. Even 
today, affinity to your tribe is strong. Nyerere s imply constructed Tanzania as a tribe and 
insisted that all cohes ive forces applied to one's tribe be applied to all people in Tanzania as 
members of one new cthnicity. In 1959, shortly before independence, leaders of the Tanganyika 
African National Union (T ANU), the dominant political party under the leadership of 
Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, expressed the desire to usc citizenship legislation to make a definitive 
break with racist colonial policies, unite the country around a common identity, and promote 
35 Oche 0, An African Ethos of Citizenship. 167. 
36 Oche 0 , An African Ethos of Citizenship. 167. 
37 Oche 0, An African Ethos of Citizenship, 167. 
3~ Metz T., • Ethics in Africa and in Aristotle: some points of contrast', volume 13, University of Johannesburg, 
Department of Philosophy Journal (20 12), J 00. 
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pan-African ism. 39 The preceding British citizenship policies were highly discriminatory on the 
grounds of race with immigration laws that established border control based on race that would 
control the entry of Europeans, Asians and sometimes Arabs, into Tanzanian territory.40 
Nyerere therefore proceeded to vouch for the building of a nation that would strive to 
institutionalise a practice among citizens and non-citizens-alike that encourages them to treat 
each other with dignity and respect, for no other reason other than for the fact of their humanity. 
This chapter wi11 attempt to theorize the motivations that inspired Nyerere to go against the 
grain. 
2.4 Nyerere's grounds for inclusive Nation-Building 
Nyerere was a firm believer in the common and indivisible nature of humankind and his vision 
of Tanganyika was consistent with his opposition to all forms of discrimination anywhere in 
the world by virtue of the common nature of humanity the world over. 41 Human rights are 
common and universal because everyone is born with and possesses the same rights, regardless 
of where they Uve, their gender or race, or their religious, cultural or ethnic background. 
Inalienable because people's rights can never be taken away. 42 The following are instances of 
how Nyerere committed to promoting inclusion based on humanity. 
2.4.1 Rejecting Racism 
British colonial officials recogrused Europeans as citizens ofEuropean states and the so-called 
natives (Africans) as subjects, and eventually Protected Persons (BPPs), of Britain.43 Native 
inhabitants referred to those that lost any German nationality they had prior to the war44, 
without gaining the nationality of the British powers thus mabng the native ofTanganyika a 
Stateless person and without a nationality. These natives were however accorded the 
opportunity of obtaining British naturalisation.45 This alleged opportunity for naturalisation 
39 Miller Lee C., Who are the "permanent inhabitants" of the state? Citizenship policies and border conh·o/s in 
Tanzania, /920- I 980. PhD (Doctor ofphilosophy) thesis, University oflowa, 20 II , 90. 
40 Miller Lee C., Who are the "permanent inhabitants" of the slate? 90. 
'11 Speech by Mwalimu Julius Nycrere, The Common and Indivisible Humanity of all Mankind, available in 
Freedom and Liberation: A selection of speeches .from I 974 to I 999 by Julius K. Nyerere, OUP Dares Salaam, 
2011 , 155. 
42 United Nations Populations Fund. Human Rights Principles , https://www.unlha.org/resources/human-rights-
principlcs on 28 March 2018. 
43 Miller Lee C., Who are the "permanent inhabitants" of the state? 95. 
44 The war here refers to the Maji-Maji revolt that took place from 1905 to 1907 and was a resistance against 
Gennan colonial rule in Tanganyika. See, The Maji Maji Revolt in Tanzania 1905-1907, 
http://www .globalblackhistory.com/20 16/06/maji-maji-rc' olt-lanzania-1905-1907 .html on 6 September 2017. 
45 Miller Lee C., "Who are the "permanent inhabitants" of the state? Citizenship policies and border conh·ols in 
Tanzania, 1920-1980," 95. 
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was very expensive and restrictive for most Africans. The British were highly dependent on 
the notions of race and subjccthood and thus hindered all efforts by non-white subjects to ga in 
British citizenship. They wou ld subject them to rigorous procedures such as literacy and 
English tests and administer exorbitant i1mnigrant poll taxes. 46 In 1959, he eliminated racial 
exclusion by explicitly stating that Tanganyika would be a non-racial society where people of 
all races would be entitled to citizenship and equal treatment under the law. He thus reassured 
Asians, Europeans and Arabs present at the time that they were free to live in Tanganyika after 
independence without fear ofbeing expelled by tbe new government.47 
The years 1959 to J 961 were characterised by a budding hostility towards foreigners thus 
necessitating the 1961 Parliamentary debate on C itizenship whose main aim was to rid tbe 
country of a racially diverse group of foreign investors, refugees and naturalised Tanganyikan 
citizens who had not renounced their former nations.48 Certain leaders within TANU opposed 
Nyerere's move to welcome all races into Tanzania indiscriminately stating that he failed to 
take into account years of accumulated privilege accrued to Europeans and Asians as members 
ofracial groups. 49 Nyererc however remained loyal to inclusion and repeatedly emphasized, 
"What we want is a society where the individual matters, not the colour of his skin or the shape 
of his nose."50 Race, for Mwalimu Nyerere had the potential to be the most divisive socia l 
attribute and he went on to emphatically proclaim that the race issue was a matter of principle 
that cou ld not be compromised and that citizenship was to be based solely on loyalty to a nation 
and not on race or any other criterion. Anything to the contrary was deemed a potential threat 
to national unity. 51 
2.4.2 Nationalism 
Nyerere acknowledged that nationhood prior to independence was defined by artificial borders 
imposed by the colonial powers. 52 These boundaries enclosed Africans within different ethno-
linguistic groups53 and as Oche observes, true belonging was only possible in geographical 
46 Paul K., Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era Cornell University Press 2013. I 3. 
47 Aminzadc R., Race. Nation. and Citi=enship in Postcolonial Africa: The Case o.fTrmzania. Cambridge 
University Press. 2013, 32 I. 
4~ Amin7..ade R., Race. Nation. and Citizenship in Postcolonial Africa. 32 I. 
49 Aminzade R .. Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Postcolonial Africa, I I 7. 
so Mwakikagile G., • Nyerere and Africa: End of an Era ', New Africa Press, 2007, I I 8. 
51 Mwakikagile G., 'The Union o_{Tanganyika and Zanzihar: Product of the Cold War'. New Africa Press, 20 I 5, 
30. 
52 Soyinka, Amin, Selassie, Mugo, Mkandawire, 'Reimagining Pan-Aji·icanism: Distinguished Mw{llimu Nyerere 
Lecture Series 2009 - 3013, · Mkuki na Nyota, Dares Salaam, 2015, 129. 
53 Soyinka, Amin, Selassie, Mugo, Mkandawire, 'Reimagining Pan-Africanism.· Distinguished Mwalimu Nyerere 
Lecture Series 2009 - 3013. · Mkuki na Nyota, Dar cs Salaam, 20 I 5, 129. 
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areas where the inhabitants could trace their tribal or ethnic origins effortlessly. 54 For Nyerere, 
this process of nation-building meant breaking away from colonial precedent and creating new 
nations that would be void of the history of common oppression within the delineated 
boundaries put up by the colonial governments. ss If this was not the case, citizenship would 
continue to discriminate against those indigenous groups that could not clearly prove their ties 
to a particular area. 
2.4.3 Pan-Africanism 
Pan-Africanism is a philosophy and movement aimed at unifying all native Africans and people 
of African heritage. 1t sets aside cu ltural differences in the struggle against s lavery, racism, and 
colonialism and shares a common goal of promoting equal rights, self-government, and a 
recognition of shared experiences. 56 Having been rooted in crisis and the suffering of Africans 
under colonial rule as well as the transatlantic s lave trade, pan-afiicanism is a call for unity. 57 
Speaking on pan-Africanism in his book ' Africa Must Unite' , Kwame Nkrumah described this 
call for unity with the following remark, "If we are to remain free, if we are to enjoy the fu ll 
benefits of Africa's rich resources, we must unite to plan for our total defence and the full 
exploitation of our material and human means, in the full interests of all our peoples. ' To go it 
alone' will limit our horizons, curtail our expectations, and threaten our liberty."58 Nyerere's 
desire was for this unity to begin with citizenship because the welcoming of all indigenous 
African communities residing in Tanzania albeit not originally from there, was pivotal in 
contributing to continental unity. 59 
2.4.4 Self-Determination 
All peoples have a right to self-determination and citizenship matters are not an exception. 
Echoing the Nationality Decrees Advisory Opinion, the question of nationality is in principle, 
a matter of domestic concern unless it involves the interpretation of international instruments 
54 Oche 0, 'Beyond Rights and Responsibilities: An African Ethos a_( Citizenship ', 2014, 169. 
55 Soyinka, Amin, Selassie, Mugo, Mkandawire, 'Reimagining Pan--1fricanism: Distinguished Mwalimu Nyerere 
Lee/lire Series 2009 - 3013, ' 129. 
56 Definition of Pan-africanism available at https://www.che!!g.com/homcwork-helr/definitions/pan-afiicamsm-
47 on 30January, 2018. 
57 Soyinka, Amin, Selassie, Mugo, Mkandawire, 'Reimagining Pan--1fricanism: Distinguished Mwalimu Nyerere 
Lecture Series 2009 - 3013, ' 120. 
58 Nkrumah K., Africa Must Unite, Frederick A. Praeger, lnc., New York, 1963, pg xvii. 
59 Soyinka, Amin, Selassie, Mugo, Mkandawire, 'Reimagining Pan-Africanism: Distinguished Mwalimu 
Nyerere Lecture Series 2009 - 3013, · Mkuki na Nyota, Dar cs Salaam, 2015, L29. 
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on nationality that give rise to international obligations.60 On the face of it, self-determination 
appears to be contrary to the spirit of pan-african ism because with it comes the right to exclude. 
At the point of state creation, self-determination may be exclusionary in determining who 
constitutes the new state. However, it has the potential to be inclusive if it is viewed from an 
internal perspective and as a central pillar of nation building. This is the view of self-
detennination that Nyerere possessed, one that intentionally guaranteed equal rights and 
opportunities particularly in multi-ethnic nations. Therefore, self-detennination meant that 
African nations ought to choose from the onset , to place the humanity of Africans over and 
above independence. 6! 
2.5 Conclusion 
The kind of inclusiveness that was sought after by the Nyererian mode of state creation is an 
indication as to why there would be a leaning towards the enactment of citizenship laws based 
on the jus soli principle of granting citizenship at bitth. The jus soli rule recognises the right of 
each person born within the physical jurisdiction of a given state to acquire fu ll and equal 
membership of that state. 62 It is evident that Nyercre did not want to leave any openings for 
denial of Tanzanian citizenship to persons or a different race, religion, ethnic belonging or 
origiJlS. 
60Nationali~>' Decrees in Tunis and Morocco. Advisory Opinion. Permanent Court of lntemarional Justice, 7'b 
February, l923. 
61 Soyinka, Amin, Selassie, Ml.igo. Mkandawire, 'Reimagining Pan-A.fricanis m: Distingui,\·hed Mwalimu 
Nyerere Lecture Series 2009 - 3013, ' 132. 
62 Ellen van Waas L., 'Nationa/i~y Matters: Statelessn<?ss under fnlemational Law·. volume 29, School of Human 
Rights Research Series, 49. 
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CHAPTER3 
UNRIDDLING JUS SOU AND JUS SANGUINIS 
3.1 Introduction 
Most African countries like most countries in the world apply a compromise in their laws 
goveming citizenship between the two basic concepts known as jus soli, whereby an individual 
obtains citizenship because he or she was bom in a particular country, and jus sanguinis, where 
citizenship is based on descent from parents who themselves were citizens. 63 As was seen in 
Chapter 3, the choice of either in Africa has been influenced mostly by the continent's colonial 
history and the subsequent process of state succession following independence. 64 This chapter 
will therefore provide a deeper analysis of the two concepts. 
3.2 The Origins of the Law of the Soil and the Law of Descent 
The jus soli rule is a criterion for allocating or withholding birth right to any person born on 
territory over which a particular state maintains sovereignty. 65 It is usually applied with an 
exception for the children of diplomats or other state representatives. 66 It recognises the right of 
each person born within the physical jurisdiction of a given state to acquire fu lJ and equal 
membership of that state. 67 
The principle of jus soli is a common law principle and can be traced back to the Roman empire 
where everyone on Roman territory would be granted citizenship save for the those that took up 
anns against the empire.68 In its purest fonn, the principle is blind to any other considerations 
but the place of birth. Any child bom under the jurisdiction of a given polity must therefore 
automatically acquire citizenship- regardless of the circumstances of the parents ' entry into the 
country, their legal (or illegal) residence, the child's length of stay in the state or effective ties to 
the state. The only relevant factor is the question as to whether the person was born within the 
territory over which the state maintains, has maintained or wishes to extend, its sovereignty. 69 
63 Manby 8 , Citizenship law in Africa: A comparative study, Open Society Foundations, New York. 20 I 0, 26. 
64 Manby B, Citizenship law in Africa, 26 
65 Shachar A., 'Children of a lesser State: Sustaining Global Inequality through citizenship laws', New York 
University Law School, 2003, 9. 
66 Ellen van Waas L., 'Nationality Mailers: Statelessness under lfllernationa/ Law', volume 29, School of Human 
Rights Research Series, 49. 
67 Ellen van Waas L., 'Nationality Mailers: Statelessness under International Law·, 49. 
68 https://www.ancient.cu/article/859/roman-citizenshjp/ on 25 September 2017. 
69 Shachar A., 'Children of a lesser state: Sustaining global inequality through citizenship laws', 9. 
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Jus Sa11gttinis on the other hand, is a mode of granting citizenship based on parentage and family 
links.70 It ensures that the children of the current members of a given polity are guaranteed 
citizenship in future. A law based on it will therefore tend to exclude from citizenship 
descendants of individuals who are migrants. 71 The inception of jus sanguinis can be tied to the 
Post French-Revolution Civil Code.72 The J 804 Napoleonic Code held that citizens, in particular, 
fathers, had the right to transfer their status of political membership to their offspring at birth, 
regardless of whether the child was born in France or abroad. In contrast to jus soli,jus sanguinis 
linked citizens to each other and created a class of persons enjoying common rights, bounded by 
conu110n obligations, fonnally equal before the law. 73 The nineteenth century subsequently saw 
the adoption ofthejus sanguinis principle by many other European countries, including Austria, 
Belgium, Spain, Pmssia, Italy, Russ ia. the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. 74 European 
colonial expansion further spread the jus sanguinis principle to countries outside Europe in a bid 
to keep the metropole "pure".75 These two principles essentially fonn the main criteria used by 
the law to grant citizenship and have had a part to play in the eradication or creation of 
statelessness. 
3.3 Legal Manifestation of the Law of the Soil and the Law of Descent 
The legal discourse on the right to nationality as well as these two modes of granting citizenship 
can be traced back to the Pem1anent Court of International Justice (PCU). The advisory opinion 
on the Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco76 in 1923 set the ball rolling on matters 
nationality following the First World War. Both states had put forth decrees stating that any 
person born in Tunisia and the French Zone in Morocco to at least one parent also born there, 
would acquire the Tunisian and French nationalities respectively. This solicited protests from the 
British government concerning the application of such decrees to British subjects living in the 
area who were automatically entitled to British citizenship. The Court then held that the question 
of nationality is in principle, a matter of domestic concern unless it involves the interpretation of 
70 Shachar A., 'Children of a lesser stale: Sustaining global inequality Ill rough citizenship laws', 12. 
71 Ellen van Waas L., 'Nationality mailers: Stateles.mess under international law'. 49. 
72 Shachar A., 'C/zildren of a lesser s/ale: Suslaining global inequality lhrough citizens/zip laws'. 12. 
73 Brubaker R .. 'Citizenship and Nationhood in France tmd Germany·. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1992, p.39. 
74 Weil P, 'Access to Citizenship: A comparison of twenty- five nationality laws·. 21. 
75 Various countries outside Europe sought legislative advice from leading continental coun1ries. This process was 
referred to as legal imitation and is considered one of the main sources for Japan's current use of the principle or 
j us sanguinis. See K.ashiwazaki C., 'Citizenship in Japan: Legal Practice and Contempormy Development, · 
Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, 434-471 and at 437-439. 
16 Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory Opinion, Permanent Court of International Justice. 7111 
February, 1923. 
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international instruments on nationality that give rise to international obligations. 77 This was a 
leaning towards the principle of jus sanguinis by Tunisia and Morocco that was upheJd by the 
PCIJ in its efforts to ensure that the grant of nationality remains w ithin the reserved domain of 
states. This was later upheld in the Nottebohm case in 1955.78 
In September of 1923, an advisory opinion on the Acquisition ofPolish Nationality19 was issued 
in response to uncertainties arising from the Treaty of Minorities with Poland. 80 The treaty's 
Article 4 stated verbatim; 
"Poland admits and declares to be Polish nationals, ipso facto and without the 
requirement of any fom1ality, persons of German, Austrian, Hungarian or Russ ian nationality 
who were born in the said territory of parents habitua lly resident there, even if at the date of the 
coming into force of the present Treaty they are not themselves habitua ll y resident there. "s1 
Poland however, went ahead and failed to recognize as Polish nationals, certain persons who 
were formerly German nationals, if their parents were not habitually resident in the tenitory 
which is now part of Poland. 82 The Court was therefore tasked with determining what the effect 
of the transfer of territory would be on the nationality of inhabitants and subsequently an 
interpretation of the cond itions for acquiring nationality guaranteed by the aforementioned 
article. The PCIJ held that Poland had an obligation under the treaty to protect the inhabitants of 
Poland without distinction of nationality and therefore, anyone whose nationality was in dispute 
could claim the guarantee provided for minorities under the Treaty. ll3 The PCJJ went on to state 
that conditions for acquiring Polish nationality according to the article in dispute were birth in 
the territory that formed pa11 of Poland habitual res idence of parents dUJing the time ofbi.r1h;84 a 
leaning towards jus soli. 
77 Nationality Decrees in Ttmis and Morocco. 19. 
?R See Noueboltm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala). Second Phase, International Court of Justice (JCJ), 6 April 
1955 
79 Acquisition of Polish Na1ionality, Advisory Opinion. Pcnnancnt Court of International Justice, 15'11 September 
1923. 
~0 Minority Rights Group International. World Direc:tOIJ' of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples- Poland: Germans, 
2008 
~~ Article 4, Minority Rights Group International, World Direct()ly of Minorities am/Indigenous Peoples - Poland: 
Germans, 2008. 
~2 Nationalirv Decrees in Tunis and Morocco. J 9. 
R3 Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco. 19. 
&4 Acquisition of Polish Nationality, 33. 
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3.4 The Right to Nationa lity as a matter of International Law 
3.4.1 Post First World War 
The Nationality Decrees case acknowledged that while the right to nationality cou ld be limited 
by international obligations, regulating access to nationality fell entirely witbjn the reserved 
domain of states and was not subject to any rules of international law. 85 It was until the September 
of 1924 that the Assembly of the League of Nations adopted a resolution86 establishing a 
Committee of Experts to prepare a provisional list of the subjects of international Jaw whose 
regulation by international agreement seemed most desirable and realisable then. Ultimately, the 
question of nationality fonned one of the three main agendas of The Hague Codification 
Conference in 1930 which was convened by the Assembly of the League of Nations to codify 
international rules on the same. Out ofthis conference came the Convention on Certain Questions 
relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws. 87 The aim of the said convention was to have a 
general document with international responsibi lities attaching to all states. 88 Under the 
convention, all states that were in agreement were to ensure that all its inhabitants possessed a 
nationality and work towards abolishing all cases of statelessness. 89 
In addition to the Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, 
was the Protocol relating to a certain case of Statelessness.90 This protocol was specifically 
responding to the cases of statelessness arising from exhibited emigration patterns at the time 
following the aftermath of the War of 1914 to 1919 and was aimed at checking the alarming rate 
ofstatelessness.91 In this regard therefore, the Protocol conferred upon states that had not adopted 
jus soli, the obligation to grant nationality to a person born in its territory of a mother possessing 
the nationality of that State and of a father without nationality or of unknown nationality;92an 
evident preference for the mode of jus soli. 
RS Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco. 19. 
RG Van Waas L, A 100-year (Hi)StOJ)' of Statelessness. Peace Palace Library blog on 25111 August 2016 
https://www.pcaccpalncelibrary.nl/20 16/08/a-1 00-year-history-of-statclessness/# tln3 on 17 December 2017. 
87 Van Waas L, A I 00-year (Hi)StOJ)' of Statelessness. Peace Palace Library blog on 25'h August 20 16 
https:l/www.peacepalacclibrary.nl/20 16/08/a-1 00-year-lustory-of-statelessness/11 fin3 on 17 December 2017. 
88 Remarks by Mr. M. Guerrero, Rapporteur. See League ofNations, Acts o.fThe Con.ferenc:efor the Codification of 
lntemational Law. Plenary Meetings, Geneva, August 19th, 1930. 
R9 League of Nations, Com•enlion on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law, 13 April 
1930, 179 LNTS 4137. 
90 League ofNations, Protocol Relating to a Certain Case q{Statelessness, 12 April 1930, 179 LNTS I 15. 
91 League ofNations, Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness, preamble. 
92 Article I, League ofNations, Protocol Relating to tl Certain Case of Statelessness, 12 April 1930, 179 LNTS 115. 
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3.4.2 Nationality in International Law post 1945 
The end ofthe 1939 - 1945 War, brought along challenges oflarge-scale displacement and de-
nationalisation of people. The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
requested the Secretary-General to undertake a study of this problem, in order to understand 
whether further international law on the matter was required. 93 This study was of course informed 
by the acknowledgement of everyone's right to a nationality as enshrined in Article 15 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the fact that this nationality should not be arbitrarily 
deprived of nor the change of nationality denied. 94 
The study, published in 1949, observed that although statelessness was a phenomenon as old as 
the concept of nationality it had slowly assumed unprecedented proportions. 95 The findings of 
the study eventually prompted the creation of two conventions. The first being the 1954 
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons96 which set out to deal with the treatment 
of those who had been forced to flee their country due to a well-founded fear of persecution and 
who may or may not also have been denationalised. 97 This was in response to the fact that only 
those stateless persons who were additionally refugees were covered by the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees leaving out a large number of unrecognised stateless persons. 98 
The second instrument was the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness99 which 
aimed to reduce the occurrences of persons being born stateless. 100 It prescribes safeguards aimed 
at avoiding statelessness. It therefore places an obligation on contracting parties to grant 
nationality to persons born in their territories who would otherwise be stateless. Such nationality 
shall be granted either at birth by operation of law or following an application to the relevant 
national authorities made by or on behalf of the affected person. 101 
93 Laura van Waas, A 100-year (Hi}StOJ)I of Statelessness, !w.r.s://www.peacepalacclibrary.nl/20 16/08/a-1 00-ycar-
history-of:-statelcssness/# fin3 on 17'h December 2017. 
94 Article 15, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 
95 United Nations, A Study of Statelessness, Lake Success - New York, 1949,4. 
96 Com•enlion Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. 28 September 1954, 360 UNTS 117. 
91 Laura van Waas, A I 00-year (Hi)Story• of Statelessness, hllps://www.peacepalacelibrao•.nl/20 I 6/08/a- 1 00-year-
history-of-stalelcssne..;s/# ftn3 on 17'h December 2017. 
911 Laura van Waas, A /00-year (Hi)Story of Statelessness. https://www.peacepalacelibrar\.)ll/20 I M08/a- 1 00-vear-
history-of-stalelessness/# ftn3 on l71h December 2017. 
99 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 30'11 August 1961,989 UNTS 175 
100 Preamble, Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 30'11 August 1961, 989 UNTS 175. 
101 Article I, Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 30'11 August 1961, 989 UNTS I 75. 
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3.4.3 The Right to a Nationality 
Following the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights' introduction of the right to nationality, a 
multitude of regional human rights conventions dealt with matters pertaining to this right as well 
as reaffirming it. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 102 in tandem with the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 103 protect the right of every person and child respectively, 
to acquire a nationality upon birth. The American Convention on Human Rights also reiterates 
the right of individuals to the nationality of the state in whose territory they were born if they do 
not have the right to any other nationality as well as adding that no one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his nationality or the right to change it. 104 Discrin1ination in the enjoyment of the 
right to a nationality, on the grounds of race or ethnicity, or sex, or disability, is also prohibited 
under the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 105, the 
1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Fonns ofDiscrimination Against Women 106 and the 
2007 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 107 The European Convention on 
Human Rights is glaringly silent on the right to nationality. However, the region has enacted a 
convention wholly dedicated to nationality; The European Convention on Nationality 108 proving 
its dedication to the fight against statelessness as well as discriminatory national policies. 109 The 
above legal response to the issue of statelessness over the course of the second half of the 
20111 century is evidence that the issue of statelessness was also one of human rights; statelessness 
being a severe form of violation of the right to a nationality. 110 
3.4.4 The Right to a Nationality in practice 
The Yean and Bosico Girls 111 was the first case on the American convention's right to nationality. 
This was a case of two children, born in the Dominican Republic, from a Dominican mother of 
Haitian descent and a Haitian father, who had been denied Dominican nationality due to a late 
102 Article 24, lntcmational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171. 
103 Article 7, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3. 
104 Article 20, American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969. 
105 Article 5, Convention on the Elimination of All Fom1s ofRacia1 Discrimination, 1249 UNTS 13. 
106 Article 9, Convention on the Elimination of All Fonns ofDiscrimination Against Women, 18 December 1979, 
1249UNTS 13. 
107 Article 18, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 24 January 2007, A/RES/61/1 06. 
108 The European Convention on Nationality, Council of Europe ( 1997). 
109 Laura van W a as, A 1 00-year (Hi)St01y of Stateless ness, h ttps ://www. peacepa I a eel i bra rv .n 1/20 16/08/ a -I 00-year-
historv-ot:.statelessncss/# Rn3 on 17'11 December 2017. 
110 Laura van Waas, A 100-year (Hi)St01y of Statelessness, https://www.peacepalacclibrarv.nl/20 16/08/a-1 00-year-
historv-of-statelessness/1/ ft113 on 17111 December 2017. 
111 Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, IACtHR, Judgment of September 8, 2005 (Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs), 2. 
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application for birth certificates. The process for such an application required funds that the girls' 
mother did not have at the time. The girls were resultantly left stateless for over four years and 
prevented from attending school. The Inter-American Court on Human Rights held that 
states have the obligation not to adopt practices or laws concerning the granting of nationality if 
their application fosters an increase in the number of stateless persons. 112 
At the heart of the European Convention on Nationality, Lies three general principles that inform 
its implementation; states are free to detennine who their nationals are within the limits set by 
international law, 113 statelessness shall be avoided, 114 rules relating to nationality may not be 
discriminatory. 11 5 Although faced with jurisdictional issues1 16 at its onset, the convention has 
successfully been upheld at the European Court of Human Rights with cases such as Genovese 
v Malta reaffirming that although the right to nationality is absent in the European Convention 
on Human Rights, citizenship is an aspect of a person's social identity which is protected under 
the right to private life in the convention. 117 The European Court of Justice has also played its 
part in the implementation of the convention on nationality in its leading Rottman 118 case where 
the court dwelt on the legitimacy of revoking a person's nationality where it would result in 
statelessness. Rottman bad obtained German nationality using deceptive means which under the 
convention is a sufficient ground for the revocation of nationality. However, loss of German 
nationality for Rottman would additionally leave him out of the European Union and eventually 
stateless. 119 The court therefore recognised that although devising citizenship rules was in 
principle a sovereign matter for each state, European Union member states should have due 
regard to community law, in this case the European Union law on prevention of discrimination, 
when laying down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality. 120 These rulings are 
112 Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, IACtHR, Judgment of September 8, 2005 (Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs), 2. 
113 Article 3, The European Convention on Nationality, Council of Europe (1997). 
114 Article 4 (a) and {b), The European Convention on Nationality, Council ofEurope (1997). 
115 Article 4 (c), The European Convention on Nationality, Council of Europe ( 1997). 
116 1l1e European Convention on Nationality had trouble with admissibility of cases at the European Coun of human 
Rights and European Court of Justice mainly because it did not list either of the bodies as the court with 
jurisdiction. It was up until the right to nationality was deemed to be intricately connected to the fundamental 
rights in the European Convention of Human Rights that litigation became possible. See, Laura van Waas. 
Fighting statelessness and discriminaiOIJ•nationality law in Europe. European Journal of Migration and Law. 
2012,243-260. 
117 Laura van Waas, A 100-year (Hi)StOJy o.fStatelessness, https://www.neaccpalacclibrarv.nl/20 16/0S/a- 1 00-year-
hjstory-of:.statclcssness/# ftn3 on 17'h December 2017. 
IlK Rottmann v Freistaat Bayem, Court of Justice of the European Union, 2 March 2010, case C-135/08. 
119 Rottmann v Freistaat Bayem, Court of Justice of the European Union, 2 March 20 I 0, case C-135/08 
120 Rottmann v Frcistaat Bayem, Court of Justice of the European Union, 2 March 20 I 0, case C-135/08. 
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an indication of the recognition of the right to a nationality as being inherent to one's identity as 
well as the general need to avoid statelessness. 121 
3.4.5 Africa: The Deviation? 
Much like the European Convention on Human Rights, the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights has no express mention of the right to nationality. However~ unlike the European 
region, Africa has no instrument dedicated to matters pertaining to nationality. The existing 
African treaties are also restrictive in terms of the right to nationality. 122 The African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare ofthe Child, for instance, which has been ratified by about f01ty African 
States, provides for the right to a name at birth and the right to acquire a nationality, 123 but not 
the right to a nationality at birth. 124 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa goes, contrary to pre-established international norms, 
does not mention the right of women to transmit their nationality to their spouses, and by 
providing for the primacy of nation a I laws over the provisions of treaties on non-discrimination 
in granting nationality to children. 125 
The litigation on nationality and the massive expulsions of aliens on the continent reported by 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 126 subsequently speaks to the heights 
to which problems related to statelessness and the right to nationality have scaled. In a case 
against Rwanda,127 the commission also held that the expulsion ofBurundian nationals who had 
been refugees in Rwanda for years for being a national risk was illegal especially because they 
were not allowed to defend themselves in court. The expulsion was additionally in contravention 
of the prohibition in the Banjul Charter on expelling persons on grounds of either their 
nationality, race of ethnic background without a decision taken in accordance with the law. 128 
Amnesty International v. Zambia, provided further deliberations on the question of deportations 
and expulsions while considering the deportations of William Banda and John Chinula from 
121 Laura van Waas, A I 00-yea r (H i)St01y of Statelessness, h 11 ns :/ /www. peacepa I ace! i b rarv. n 1120 1 6/08/a- I 00-year-
history-of-statclcssncss/# fin3 on I 7'h December 2017. 
122 Department ofPolitical Affairs in the African Union, ' The African Union approach to the right to nationality in 
Africa: Statelessness Impact on Africa's Development and the Need for its Eradication ', 2016. 
123 Article 6, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, ll'h July, 1990. 
124 Department of Political Affairs in the African Union, ' Tite African Union approach to the right to nationality in 
Africa: Statelessness Impact on Africa's Development and the Need for its Eradication ' . 2016. 
125 Department of Political Affairs in the African Union, 'The Afiican Union approach to the right to nationality in 
Africa: Statelessness Impact on Afiica's Development and the Need for its Eradication', 2016. 
126 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, n,e Right to Nationality in Africa, published by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 2015, 7. 
127 Organisation Mondiale Contre La Torture and Others v. Rwanda, ACmHPR Comm. Nos. 27/89, 46/91 , 49/91 
and 99/93 (1996). 
12K Article 12(4) and (5), African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 271h June 1981. 
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Zambia to Malawi and held that by forcing the complainants to live as stateless persons under 
degrading conditions, the Zambian government had violated Article 5 of the Charter on the 
dignity of a human bcing.m Additionally, the Commission held that the right to an appeal to 
competent national organs 130 includes both the initial right to take a matter to court, as well as 
the right to appeal from a tirst instance decis ion to higher tribunals. In several cases relating to 
deportations or denial of citizenship. the Commission has held that the fact that someone is not 
a citizen by itself does not justify his deportation; there must be a right to challenge expulsion on 
. d' 'd l b . 131 an m lVI ua as1s. 
The African Commission has additionally found that even without the express mention of the 
right to nationality, Article 5 on every individual ' s right to the respect of the dignity inherent in 
a human being and to the recognition of his legal status applies specifically to attempts to 
denationalise individuals and render them stateless. 132This was appJjed in the long-running case 
of John Modise v Botswana, who spent years confined either to the South African " homeland" 
of Bophuthatswana or the no-man's land between South Afi'ica and Botswana because of the 
Botswanan government 's refusal to recognise his nationality. The Commission found against the 
Botswanan government and ruled, among other conclusions, that Modisc's "personal suffering 
and indignity" violated Article 5 of the Banjul Charter. 133 
The case of the nationality of the former president of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda also influenced 
greatly the continent 's decision to take more seriously, this fundamenta l right. Zambia, in its 
amended constitution of J 996 provided that anyone running for the office of the president needed 
to provide proof that both bis or her parents are/were Zambian by birth or descent. 134 The 
government was hoping to preserve this office for Zambians with a traceable descent. However, 
this provision not only prevented Mr. Kaunda from contesting the elections but also 
disenfranchised 35% ofthe Zambian electorate. 135 The commission strongly disapproved of such 
a discriminatory national policy on the basis that it was discriminatory on the grounds of 
nationality which was forbidden by the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. 136 
129 Communication No. 2 12/98. Amnesty lntenwtional v. Zambia. (2000) AHRLR 325 (ACHPR 1999), paragraph 
50. 
130 Article 7( I a). African Chancr on Human and Peoples' Rights. 271h June 1981 . 
131 Man by B, Citizenship law in Africa: A compamtive stuc~)'. Open Society Foundations, New York, 20 I 0. 25 
132 Manby 8 , Citizens/rip law in Africa, 25 
133 Communication 97/93, Modise v. Botsumw (2000) African Human Rights Law Reports (AHRLR) 30 (ACHPR 
2000). paragraph 91. 
134 Manby B. Cirizenship law in Africa, 27. 
135 Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia, ACmHPR communication 211/98 (2001). 
136 Articles 2, 3 and 13, A fi·ican Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 271h June 1981 . 
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The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in the Nubians v Kenya 137 case asked 
of the government of Kenya to establ ish objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria 
and procedures for determining Kenyan citizenship. This was after a group ofNubians who are 
descendants of ex-Sudanese individuals were treated differently jn the search of identification 
cards because of their ethnicity and religion. The commission also reiterated that such a tenuous 
citizenship status was placing the Nubians in a dangerous s ituation as it opened an avenue for a 
violation of other rights intricately linked to citizenship. 138 
In light of the aforementioned events which are just but a few instances where the right to 
nationality has been brought to litigation, the African Conunission on Human and Peoples ' 
Rights passed a resolution 139 in furtherance of its mandate to formulate and lay down, principles 
and mles aimed at solving legal problems relating to human and peoples' rights and fundamenta l 
freedoms upon which African governments may base their legislations. 140 The 2013 resolution 
expressed its concern at the arbitrary denial or deprivation of the national ity of persons or groups 
of persons by African states, especiall y as a result of discrimination as well as regretting the 
failure of African states to ensure that all children are registered at birth. lt also re-emphasized 
that it is in tbe general interest of the people of Africa for aU Afi-ican States to recognise, 
guarantee and facilitate the right to nationality of every person on the continent and to ensure 
that no one is exposed to statelessness and called upon states to adopt and implement provisions 
in their constitutions and other legislations with a view of preventing and reducing statelessness. 
It also added that it was necessary to carry out a research on issues relating to the right to 
nationality and consequently assigned the task to the special rapporteur on refugees, asylum 
seekers; displaced and migrants in Africa. 141 
The following year, the commission passed yet another resolution 142 that tasked the special 
rapporteur on refi.tgees, asylum seekers; displaced and migrants in Africa, with the drafting of a 
Protocol to the African Cha1ier on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Right to Nationa lity in 
Africa in a bid to respond to the absence ofthe right in the charter. The resolution was cognizant 
of the fact that there was a pressing need to identify, prevent and reduce statelessness and protect 
the right to nationality. 143 
137 1l1e Nubian Community in Kenya vs 1l1e Republic of Kenya. ACmHPR communication 317 / 2006. 
138 1l1e Nubian Community in Kenya vs 1l1e Republic of Kenya. ACmHPR. paragraphs 167 and 171 . 
139 ACmHPR, Resolution 234 (20 13), Resolution on the Right to Nationali ty. 
14u Article45(l)(b). African Charter on Human and Peoples· Rights, 27'11 June 1981. 
141 ACmHPR Resolution 234 (20 13), Resolution on the Right to Nationality. 
142 ACml IPR Resolution 277 {20 14 ), Resolution on the drafting of a Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights on the Right to Nationality in AtTica. 
143 ACmHPR Resolu1ion 277 (2014). Resolution on the drafting of a Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights on the Right to Nationali1y in Africa. 
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Following the introduction of the right to nationality into international law, there has been a 
considerable amount of attention on the obligation upon states to adopt practices or laws with 
respect to the granting of nationality that would reduce the number of stateless persons. 144 Such 
an interest was bound to have a resulting effect on citizenship laws across the continent. What 
would it mean for countries that had in operation the jus sanguinis or jus soli mode of granting 
nationality and their obligation to ensure the prevention and reduction of statelessness? 
3.5 Law of the Soil or the Law of Descent? 
The question of nationality under international law as discussed earlier on in this chapter has 
exhibited a transitory pattern from being not only an issue of the application of either jus soli or 
jus sanguinis but more of laws that are objective, transparent and non-discriminatory in nature 
as well as encompassing the general obligation on the avoidance and reduction of 
statelessness. 145 As a consequence of the autonomy of states to stipulate their own nationality 
regulations, 146 statelessness is the unintentional result of a conflict between the existence of the 
two contradicting principles on which to base the attribution of nationality to a child at birth. 147 
From the onset, applyingjus soli in its purest fonn seems to be the solution for statelessness the 
world over. From a global welfare perspective, its over-inclusiveness ensures that everyone on a 
certain territory belongs to that territory and owes allegiance and faithful obedience to the 
sovereign 148 that makes this possible, from birth. However, the pure and unrestricted application 
of jus soli may be problematic. It presents an opportunity for abuse in the form of illegal 
immigration as well as undennining the notion of citizenship which is one of a mutual 
relationship between a state and an individual. It may also present issues of overpopulation. 149 
The Dominican Republic, which is a perfect example, made the shift from jus soli to jus sanguinis 
141 Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, TACtHR, 2. 
145 TI1e Nubian Community in Kenya vs The Republic ofKenya, ACmHPR communication 317 I 2006. 
146 The Pem1ancnt Court of International Justice described the grant of nationality being within the "reserved domain 
of the states'' which was later upheld in the Nottebohm case, sec, Nouebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala); 
Second Phase, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 6 Apri/1955.The court in this instance described nationality as 
being within the domestic jurisdiction of tl1e stale which settles, by its own legislation, the rules relating to the 
acquisition of its nationality. Advisory Opinion No. 4. Nationality Decrees lssued in Tunis and 
Morocco, 4, Permanent Court oflntemational Justice, 7 February 1923. 
141 In 1949, the International Law Commission placed on the list of subjects tentatively selected for codification one 
of them being nationality, including statelessness. This report was very instrumental as it not only highlighted the 
causes of statelessness but also demonstrated the necessity of having conventions created on matters statelessness 
that came in the subsequent years. See, Report on Nationality, Including Statelessness by Mr. Manley 0. Hudson, 
Special Rapporteur, 1952, 17. 
14s Lord Coke in this case employed the concept of allegiance to demonstrate the mutual relationship that exists for 
life between a monarch and aU subjects born in the king's dominion. See, Calvin 's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 
1608). 
149 Congress debatesjus soli https://migration.ucdavis.edu/nm/mor('.php?id=l\44 on 28 March, 2018. 
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due to widespread migration of persons from Haiti which resulted in overpopulation. 150 In 
pursuance of this move, in 2013, the constitutional court ofthe Dominican Republic retroactively 
stripped more than 200,000 persons of Haitian descent of their Dominican nationality. 151 The 
problem however was that the judgment contained a risk of statelessness for hundreds of 
thousands of persons, as the Dominican Republic had not proven that those affected could revert 
to their Haitian nationality. 152 
It would seem therefore, as evidenced by the Dominican Republic's move, shifting to a purely 
descent-oriented regime would result in increased statelessness but does that make it mandatory 
for states to abide by jus soli given their obligation to avoid statelessness? Jus soli, as 
aforementioned is cognisant of the aspect of global welfare. It additionally ensures that the rights 
ofthe child are promoted and protected. A child has the express right to a name and nationality 153 
and an application of jus soli ensures this indiscriminately. Pure jus soli however would be 
detrimental as it will be unable to guarantee citizenship for parents who are national of a state 
but happen to be in a different territory at the time of bearing their offspring. All proper jus soli 
systems must therefore have elements of jus sanguinis subsequently. 
Jus sanguinis has demonstrated over time that it ensures nationality for children of nationals of 
a state and as such, their descendants can never be rendered stateless. However, it cannot exist 
on its own and prevent statelessness. A good example will be at the point of state creation where 
a pure jus sanguinis regime would result in the statelessness of persons who have been lawfully 
resident in a particular territory. 
In conclusion, it is evident that these technjcalities need to be refashioned if at all statelessness 
is to be remedied such that a choice of either does not automatically exclude large populations 
of persons tied to a particular territory. There is also a pressing need for countries to enact 
citizenship laws and policies that would be unique to their populations and developmental 
history as opposed to running with foreign legislation such as those passed down from 
colonialism.154 
ISO http://w,vw.lmffingtonpost.com/entry/birthright-clttzcnship-other-counlries us 55df2a82e4b08dc0948699t3 
lSI http://stories.minorilyrights.org/dominican-republic/chaptcrl legal-section/ on 28111 December 20 I 7. 
1s2 Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, IACtHR Judgement of August 281h 2014 (Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment), para. 261. 
ISJ Article 7, UNGA, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3. 
1s4 See chapter 2 on the impact of colonialism on Kenyan nationality laws post-iudependence. 
26 
CHAPTER 4 
WHICH CRJTER10N WORKS? A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF KENYA AND 
TANZANIA. 
4.1 Introduction 
The Pemtanent Court oflnternational Justice, as discussed in the previous chapter, opined that 
the question of nationality is in principle, a matter of domestic concern unless it involves the 
interpretation of international instmments on nationality that give rise to international 
obligations. 155 Following the inculcation of the right to nationality into international law, there 
has been a considerab le amount of attention on the obligation upon states to adopt practices or 
laws with respect to the granting of nationality that would reduce the number of stateless 
persons. 156 This need was re-emphasized by the African Commission on Human and Peoples 
Rights in its call for African States to recognise, guarantee and facilitate the right to nationality 
of every person on the continent and to ensure that no one is exposed to statelessness and ca lled 
upon states to adopt and implement provisions in their constitutions and other legislations with 
a view of preventing and reducing statelessncss. 157 
One such way of meeting this obligation is having to deal with the question on whether a 
particular state's citizenship laws applying at birth wil l be driven by either the jus soli orjus 
sanguinis principle as well as the resultant effect of such a move on statelessness. As was stated 
in chapter 3, as a consequence of the autonomy of states to stipulate their own nationality 
regulations, 15s statelessness may be the unintentional result of a conflict between the existence 
of the two contradicting principles on which to base the attribution of nationality to a child a1 
birth.159 Thjs chapter will grapple with the application of jus sanguinis and jus soli in Kenya 
and Tanzania respectively and compare the extent to which both states have interacted with, 
reduced or effectively dealt w ith the issue of statelessness as a result of the application of their 
citizenship laws. 
155 Nationa/i~y Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, PCU report 19. 
156 Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic. IACtHR, 2. 
157 ACmi iPR Resolution 234 (20 13). Resolution on the Right to Nationality. 
158 The Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala): Second Phase, lntemational Court of Justice (ICJ), 6 April 
1955. 
159 See, Report 011 Nationality, Including Statelessness by Mr. Manley 0. Hudson, Special Rapporteur, 1952, 17. 
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4.2 Salient features of Kenya's Citizenship Laws 
The regulation of citizenship in Kenya dates back to 1963, following the attainment of 
independence with the first pieces of legislation being the Independence Constitution and the 
Citizenship Act of 1963. These laws regarding citizenship post-colonialism were 
fundamentally similar to the British order which was not only exclusionary in nature but also 
very difficult to implement particularly for a new self-governing state. 160 According to the 
British laws, which were replicated in the Independence Constitution of Kenya, one could only 
automaticaUy upon attain Kenyan citizenship after meeting one of the following criteria 161 : 
• Being born in Kenya on 11th December, 1963 and is a citizen of the United Kingdom 
and Colonies or a British Protected Person (BPP), 162 
• Being born outside Kenya, and is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or a 
British protected person shall, if his father becomes, or would but for his death have 
become, a citizen of Kenya by virtue of the aforementioned provision, 
• Being born into a family that has spent 2 generations in Kenya prior to 1963 white sti ll 
meeting the jus soli requirement of being born in the territory. 
The Independence Constitution was additionally express on its jus sanguinis stance in stating 
that person shall not become a citizen ofKenya by virtue of the aforementioned section of law 
if neither ofhis parents was born in Kenya. 163 Automatic citizenship was therefore only granted 
to persons that met the above requirements and this in tum made it very difficult for non-
indigenous groups to gain citizensbip. 164 The Kenyan-Asians are an example of persons who 
despite the long-standing presence in Kenya, could not gain Kenyan citizenship following the 
attainment of independence. The Asian community in Kenya did not fit the definition of a tribe, 
given their diverse religious, socio-cultural, linguistic and ancestral homelands and thus had 
no claim to Kenyan citizenship based on descent. 165 
Years later, with the promulgation of the 20 I 0 Constitution, came a change in the laws on 
citizenship as well as the enactment of the Immigration and Citizenship Act of20 II . Although 
the constitution scraped off most of the provisions protecting foreigners i.e. the British, it still 
160 Blitz B. and Lynch M, Statelessness and citizenship: A comparative study 011 the be11~{its qfnatiollality. 20 II. 
47. 
161 Section 87, Repealed Constitution of Kenya, 1963. 
1621mps://www.whatpassport.com/countrics/UnitedKingdom/Passport 1Vo26 Nationality/British Protected Pers 
on (BPP) 
IC•3 Section 87, Repealed Constitution ofKenya, 1963. 
164 Blitz B. and Lynch M, Statelessness and citizenship: A comparative study on the benefits of nationality, 20 II , 
46. 
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relies heavily on proof of descent to grant Kenyan citizenship upon buth. A person is only a 
Kenyan citizen by birth if either the father or mother is a Kenyan citizen. 166 However, it 
provides for the granting of citizenship by birth to children found in Kenya who are, or appear 
to be, less than eight years of age, and whose nationality and parents are not known; a core 
component of the reduction of statelessness. 167 It additionally provides for citizenship through 
registration under the tenets of marriage, lawful residence or adopti.on I Gil and allows for dual 
citizenship 169 albeit this will not be necessary for this study since jus sanguinis and jus soli are 
modes of granting citizenship on account of birth. 
Not only are these sentiments regarding citizenship by birth 170 and the limitation as to 
descent 171 echoed in the Immigration and Citizenship Act of20 11 , but the Act also goes ahead 
to provide for stateless persons which is a pertinent provision for this study. Section 15 allows 
for a person who does not have an enforceable claim to the citizenship of any recognized state 
and has been living in Kenya for a continuous period since independence, to be deemed to have 
been lawfully resident. Such a person may on application, in the prescribed manner, be eligible 
to be registered as a citizen of Kenya if the following onerous grounds are proved: adequate 
knowledge of I<.iswahili or a local dialect, lack of a conviction and imprisonment sentence for 
a tenn of three years or longer, the intention to continue to permanently reside in Kenya or to 
maintain a close and continuing association with Kenya upon registration as a citizen; and an 
understanding of the rights and duties of a Kenyan citizen. 172 It also attaches the manifestation 
of jus sanguinis to the descendants of stateless persons who upon attaining the age of majority 
have parents or if deceased, had parents who were eligible to be registered under the Act as 
long as they meet the same section 15 requirements. 173 
4.2.1 Analysing Kenya's Citizenship Law 
From the analysis above, it is crystal that Kenya has been and continues to be a nation that 
heavily relies on lineage when granting citizenship by birth to persons on the tetTitory. ft is 
impottant to note, however, that the recomse provided for stateless persons under section 15 
of the C itizenship and Immigration Act of20 II is through regish·ation and does not guarantee 
166 Article 14. Constitution of Kenya, 20 I 0. 
167 Article 14 (4), Constitution of Kenya, 20 I 0. 
16g Article 15, Constitution of Kenya, 20 I 0. 
169 Article 16 Constitution of Kenya, 20 I 0. 
170 Section 6, Kenya Citizenship and lmmigra6on Act, of20 II . 
171 Section 7, Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act, of2011. 
172 Section 15, Kenya Citizenship and Immigration A cr. of20 II . 
173 Section 17, Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act, of20 II. 
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citizenship to such persons at birth which is what jus soli or jus sanguinis is concerned with. 
Kenya l1as also ratified the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness which places obligations that the aforementioned 
section 15 may have been trying to address. The same ob ligations have a lso been enforced 
against Kenya in the Nub ian cases at the African Court ofHurnan and Peoples Rights and are 
precisely speaking to section 15 of the Citizenship and [mrnigration Act, of20 11. The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples ' Rights in the Nubia11S v Kenya 174 case asked of the 
government of Kenya to establish objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria and 
procedures for determining Kenyan citizenship. 
Has the application of jus sanguinis furthered the achievement of this obligation or has it been 
a contributing factor to the growing number of stateless individuals across the continent? Is the 
requirement to apply for citizenship through registration the intended effect for a jus sanguinis 
regime with respect of statelessness persons and if so, can such a citizen pass on citizenship to 
his or her descendants? This section will highlight the application ofjus sanguinis in Kenya 
vis a vis the creation of statelessness with respect to the Kenyan - Asians, Nubians and 
Makonde communities in Kenya. 
The statelessness of the Ke11yan - Asians was sanct ioned by law. Donald Rothschild, observes 
that at the time East Africa Protectorate was declared a colony in 1920, there was a tiered social 
and economic structure drawn on racial lines. The Europeans held all of the prominent places 
in tbe public and private sectors of the economy. The Asians predominated in the middle-level 
positi011S as artisans, clerks, professionals, merchants and tradesmen with AfricatlS occupying 
the lowest level and formed an unskilled labour pool on the fanns, homes and factories. With 
racial tensions intensified, Africans expressed their unwillingness to permit otber races to 
maintain their privileged status. 175 In contrast to Tanzania, Kenyans, upon independence 
demanded to expel all immigrants from Kenya and this could be deemed as the reason for a jus 
sanguinis regime. The treatment of Asians in Kenya was therefore a resu lt of the refusal of the 
post-colonial government of Kenya to include, as Kenyans, communities that had established 
long-standing ties and attachments to the tetTitory. There was a lot of hatred towards the Asians 
and foreigners in general following the attainment of independence and in a bid to exclude the, 
m The Nubian Community in Kenya vs The Republic of Kenya, ACmHPR conm1Unication 317 / 2006. 
175 Rothschild D., 'Citizenship and national integration: the non-African crisis in Kenya, ' University of Denver, 
Volume I, 1970, 40. 
30 
the Asians in Kenya were rendered stateless by law. 176 A jus sanguinis regime only sweetened 
the deal; the Asians present at the time could not prove their descent fi·om a Kenyan. 
The Nubians in Kenya descended from the Nuba mountains found in what is cun·ent day central 
Sudan and had been conscripted into the colonial British army without being granted British 
citizenship. Their demands to return to Sudan were also not met and no resettlement scheme 
was provided for them in Kenya. 177 In a case brought before the African Court on Human and 
People' s Rights on behalf ofNubian children, it was noted that the main difficulty in granting 
nationality is the requirement on proof of descent. For instance, the fact that many of these 
parents lack valid identity documents, having been stripped of them by the colonial 
government, further complicates their efforts to register their children's births. It was f.i.uther 
alleged that the Kenyan government does not recognize birth registration documents as proof 
of citizenship178 thus denying the Nubian children born in the country the right to a name and 
nationality. 179 Not only did the application of jus sanguinis make it impossible for the Nubian 
children to acquire citizenship, but their parents also found it difficult to obtain citizenship in 
the country. 
In yet another case, the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare oflbe Child 
held that it is rightly said that birth registration is tbe State's first official acknowledgment of 
a child ' s existence, and a child who is not registered at birth is in danger of being shut out of 
society and thus denied the right to an official identity, a recognized name and a nationality. tllO 
The Complainants allege that the treatment of children of Nubian descent violates their right 
to be registered at the time of t11eir birth, because some parents have difficulty having their 
children registered especially since many public hospital officials reft1se to issue birth 
cet1ificates to children ofNubian descent. 1 RI The Nubians recently had their land rights in Kibra 
recognised after a lengthy struggle. However, The Nubians continue to face significant 
obstacles in their efforts to secure national identity documentation and are the only non-border 
minority whose are subject to special vetting procedures when applying for their national 
identity card at age 18. This is in spite of the introduction of section 15 of the Citizenship and 
Immigration Act of20 II which would automatically grant them citizenship on account of their 
l7<> Aminzade R. , Race, Nation, and Citi=enship in Postcolonial Africa: The Case of Tanzania. I 15. 
177 The Nubian Community in Kenya vs TI1e Republic of Kenya, ACmHPR communication 317 / 2006. 
178 The Nubian Community in Kenya vs The Republic of Kenya, ACmHPR communication 3 J 7 / 2006. 
179 Article 6. Airican Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, II July 1990, CAB/LEG/24.9/49. 
ll!O Article 6, African Charter on the Righls and Welfare ofthe Child, J I July 1990, CAB/LEG/24.9/49. 
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presence in the country s ince independence and the fact that they have no enforceable claim to 
the citizenship of any other recognized state. 182 
The Makonde are a Bantu speaking community that originated from the Northern part of the 
Republic of Mozambique mainly Mwende district of Cabb Derogado province. The Kenyan 
Makonde are estimated to be 4000 people and they started streaming into Kenya as early as 
1948 and have remained in the country since. 183 The Kenyan Makonde consists of descendants 
of exiled freedom fighters, refugees fleeing civil war, labourers who were recruited by the 
British during the colonial period to work iu sisal fam1s and sugar plantations across Kenya 's 
coastal province in Kwale, Kilifi and Taita Taveta. After Kenya 's independence, they were 
neither repatriated nor given Kenyan identification. 184 The Makonde however, are not 
recognised as being among the tribes ofKenya. In fact, they have been rendered stateless during 
their period of residence in the country despite no longer identifying as Mozambicans or the 
fact that majority of their children were born in Kenya. Their children even on attaining the 
age of majority, cannot apply for identification cards and the birth of every child in their 
community is not recognized by the issuance of birth certificates. 185 The Makonde Community 
had no claim, at the first instance, under the mode of birth as a form of acquiring citizenship in 
Kenya. This is probably because their origin bas successfully been traced back to Mozambique 
making it difficult for them to prove ties to Kenya through descent. However, by virtue of 
Section 15 of the Immigration and Citizenship Act, the subsequent generations that have 
continued to reside in Kenya 186 since their arrival ought to have been granted citizenship in 
order for their children to be deemed to have been born ofKenyan parents. 
4.2.2 Kenya's Pattern of Exclusion 
The three groups are similar in that they have all been present in the country s ince before the 
attainment of independence and have consequently established long-standing ties and 
attachments to the country. Their non-recognition is proof of the exclusionary method of state 
succession taken up by Kenyan leaders post colonialism. ln contrast to Tanzania, Kenyans, 
upon independence demanded to expel all immigrants from Kenya and this could be deemed 
182 Section 15, Kenya Cilizenship and Immigration Act, of2011. 
183 hnps://gz.com/91 0868/k en yas-makonde-people-on gina II v-from -moza mbigue-had-not-becn-recogn ized-as-
citizens-till-now/ on 28 March 2018. 
1114 UNHCR online publication, 'The Makonde of Kenya - The stntggle to belong ·. hllp://www.unhcr.orgtkelwp-
contcnt/uploadJ:/sites/2/20 1 6/05/The-Makonde-ot~Kenya-The-Struggle-To-Belongl.pdf on l51h January, 
2018. 
1 KS https://www.cnca.com/a ti-ica/stateless-kcnyas-makonde-people accessed on 27th January. 2018. 
186 Section 15, Kenya Citizenship and Inunigration Act, of20ll. 
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as the reason for a jus sanguinis regime. It can be concluded that the exclusionary nature of the 
Kenyan laws may have made way for the creation of statelessness especially with regard to the 
African communities present in the country before and after the attainment of independence. 
These laws were not an appropriate legal framework, specific to African and colonial Kenya 's 
history in particular. 
In the transition from being a colony to an independent state, the application of the jus soli 
principle would have been more preferred in order to accommodate the Kenyan-Asians, the 
Nubians and the Makonde and prevent the continual infringement of their human rights on 
account oftheir statelessness. The subsequent application of jus sanguinis would have in tum 
ensured protection for the descendants of these communities going forward thus justifying the 
argument put forward in chapter 3 that all proper jus soli systems include or ought to include 
an element of jus sanguinis subsequently. 
Needless to say, the reluctance of the Kenyan government, despite having international 
obligations and provisions on statelessness under domestic law has been to attributed to traces 
of discrimination and lack of adherence to laws as well as numerous delays at the immigration 
department. 187 Even the recent recognition of the Makonde carne six months before the 2017 
general elections with the president, also a candidate for re-election, on record for demanding 
the speedy issuance if identity cards to the Makonde community allowing them to vote. 18& 
Political expediency or renewed fide lity to the law and international obligations? 
4.3 Tanzania; Glitter or Gold? 
Mwalimu Julius Nyerere's push for racial inclusion in 1959 offset the initial enactment and 
subsequent development of Tanzania 's citizenship laws.189 From 1920 to 1980, British colonial 
authorities and post-colonial Tanzanian leaders struggled with African mobility and identities. 
Border-crossers, including labour migrants, refugees, immigrants, and smugglers, were 
therefore viewed as problematic. As the state transitioned to independence, nationalist leaders 
187 'Makonde granted Kenyan citizens/rip ', Daily Nation, I 51 February 20 I 7, 
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created Tanzanian citizenship and claimed to embrace trans-border African mobility in order 
to reject colonial racist views and promote Pan-African ism. 19° 
Following the attainment of independence in 1961 , there was a parliamentary debate set as ide 
to discuss the issue of citizenship. This debate was made necessary by increasing concerns 
about security, political opposition, land-use, and a strained economy resulting from the move 
to assimilate all persons under Tanzanian territory as citizens. These reasons contributed to 
some of the state officials to want to state harden borders. 191 The parliamentary debate birthed 
the 1961 Citizenship Ordinance of Tanganyika. The ordinance had traces of jus sanguinis as it 
only allowed citizenship by birth to those born in or out of Tanganyika on condition that they 
were either a citizen of the United Kingdom and its Colonies or a British Protected Person born 
of at least one parent born in Tanganyika or possessing Tanganyikan citizenship. 192 
The Tanzania Citizenship Act of 1995 193 was the definitive break from granting citizenship by 
application of the law of descent making Tanzania one of the 30 countries that apply 
unrestricted jus soli. 194 From the face of it, the application of unrestricted jus soli is as inclusive 
as it gets for any state. As was stated in the previous chapter, the principle is blind to any other 
considerations but the place of birth. Therefore, any child born under the jurisdiction of 
Tanzania automatically acquires citizenship- regardless of the circumstances of the parents ' 
entry into the country, their legal (or illegal) residence, the child 's length of stay in the state or 
effective ties to the state. The relevant factor is the question as to whether the child was born 
within the territory over which the state maintains, has maintained or wishes to extend, its 
sovereignty. 195 For adults, in addition to proving birth in Tanzania, there is the additional 
requirement of naturalization and renouncing their fonner citizenship, if any. 196 
One would expect therefore that with the application of jus soli, issues of granting citizenship 
to foreigners living in Tanzania would be non-existent as long as the jus soli requirement is 
met sufficiently. It was therefore very astonishing when, following the 1995 Act, Tanzanian 
state officials began using citizenship as a political weapon. Oscar Kambona, a prominent 
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politician in Tanzania, was prevented from returning to Tanzania from a period of seeking 
political refuge in Britain on the grounds that he was not a citizen despite having been born in 
Kenya of parents from Malawi. 197 Vocal opposition to the government also led to ruling party 
leaders persuading the government to strip a number of influential figures of their citizenship 
status. In 2001, for instance, the former Tanzanian ambassador to N igeria and Ethiopia, 
Timothy Bandera, Anatoli Amani, Kagera regional CCM198 chairman and Mouldine Castico, 
a National Executive Committee Member lost their citizenship even after the government 
acknowledged that they were indeed born in Tanzania, only to foreign parents. 199 
The crisis of about 200000 Burundian refugees200 in Tanzania in 1995 became the ultimate test 
of Tanzania's jus soli regime and its effectiveness. In response to their arrival, the Tanzanian 
government, contrary to global expectations, created policies to close down the borders with 
Burundi and initiated elaborate plans to repatriate the refugees back to Burundi 201 because 
repatriation is typically favoured over local integration as the most desired "durable 
solution". 202 However, the refugees, having fled Burundi in 1972, had lost all connections with 
the state and had established ties to Tanzania with many Tanzanians living in proximity to the 
former refugees wanting them to be allowed to stay as they had become a vital part ofthe local 
economy. 203 The government however continued to deny their applications to be naturalized 
as Tanzanian citizens and their offspring were denied citizenship on account of their birth in 
Tanzania. This led to some form of protracted exile with the refugees facing an imminent threat 
in becoming stateless. 204 It was in 2008 that the Tanzanian government yielded to the refugees ' 
pleas and promised them citizenship in a move that lauded the world over as the move that 
would avert a growing cris is that had led to those caught up in its midst effectively stateless. 205 
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Implementation of the same has however been elusive. The Tanzanian government began to 
see how much their 'open-door' policy was proving to be cumbersome with issues of 
overpopulation and insecurity emanating from the application of unrestricted jus soli hence the 
reluctance to award citizenship. 206 The generous principle was therefore becoming increasingly 
caught up in rea/politik.201 The process itself, therefore, has revealed a huge gap between the 
idea of citizenship and its realisation. In practice, these former refugees, have been required to 
renounce their Burundian nationality which they no longer possessed and have spent the past 
few years being told that the process is incomplete coupled with refusal of certificates 
confinning their new status. As a result, neither the status "refugee" nor "citizen" could be 
applied seamlessly to this group, leaving their legal status highly ambiguous. 208 Their eventual 
recognition came in 20 14 after decades of struggle and legal limbo. 209 
Tanzania 's story is evidence of the lack of allegiance to legislation in as much as they accorded 
citizenship to the Burundian refugees. The strict application of jus soli would have presented a 
different pattern of execution. It also clarifies that the use of unrestricted jus soli is slowly 
becoming undesirable due to its over- inclusiveness210 and warrants a remodeling ofthe same 
to prevent issues of overpopulation and abuse. Jus soli, as aforementioned is cognizant of the 
aspect of global welfare. 211 It additionally ensures that the rights of the child are promoted and 
protected. A child has the express right to a name and nationaJity212 and an application ofjus 
soli ensures this indiscriminately. However, a pure jus soli regime presents additional 
challenges for the same citizens when they bear children away from home. Their children are 
denied Tanzanian citizenship on account of their being born outside the territory; an anomaly 
that a jus sanguinis regime would have sufficiently addressed. In as much as jus soli may 
effectively contribute to the aversion of statelessness, its Jack of restriction necessitates its 
review so as to not only protect the rights of these vulnerable populations but also to respect 
the autonomy of states in controlling the constituents of their nations. 
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CHAPTERS 
FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS and CONCLUSION 
It is evident throughout this study that state creation m Africa after the attainment of 
independence by former colonies played a great role in the creation of statelessness. Afi·ican 
leaders had to work through the nation-building agenda in political units comprising of people 
from different cultures, religions and languages. The rules of state succession therefore were 
particularly sensitive in the context of citizenship law. 213 An examination of the patterns of 
state creation exhibited by Tanzania and Kenya serves as proof of the sensitivities and 
motivations that lead a country to develop citizenship laws in a manner they deem tit for their 
situation. 
Subsequently, the laws governing citizenship in most African countries developed along the 
lines of a compromise between two concepts;jus soli whereby an individual obtains citizenship 
because he or she was born in a particular country and jus sanguinis where citizenship is based 
on descent from parents who themselves are or were citizens. 214 
This paper set out to determine whether the application of jus sang11inis by Afi·ican states has 
contributed significantly to the creation and continuance of stateless on the continent and 
whether the application of its antithesis would be the remedy to the long-standing problem of 
statelessness. 
The research was largely guided by the hypothesis that countries that grant citizenship through 
the application of the law of the soil have less issues of statelessness as compared to those that 
grant citizenship through the application of the law of descent. 
5.1 Findings 
It is indeed tme that countries that employ jus soli instead ofjus sanguinis have less incidences 
of statelessness. However, this phenomenon is conditional on the finding that jus soli cannot 
exist and therefore effectively remedy statelessnesl' without the aid of jus sanguinis. At the 
point of state creation, a jus soli regime ensures that all the persons born on a particular territory 
acquire its citizenship and thus caters for persons who have been lawfully resident in the area 
and established long and effective ties with the polity. However, a pme jus soli regime 
following state creation could also create statelessness particularly in instances where citizens 
213 Man by B, Citizenship law in Africa: A comparative study. Open Society Foundations, New York, 20 I 0, 21. 
214 Manby B, Citizens/rip law in Africa, 25. 
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happen to give birth outside the state. The jus soli principle is an ideal that may not always 
work in practice. At first instance, in a bid to meet the international obligation to avoid 
statelessness, the law of the soil may appear to be the perfect remedy. However, the study of 
Tanzania proves that it may be harder to implement this in practice. For instance. despite having 
a robust legal regime founded on the law of the soil, the Burundian refugees in Tanzania 
remained stateless for over 50 years since their arrival. In response to their arrival, the 
Tanzanian government, contrary to globa l expectations, created policies to close down the 
borders with Burundi and initiated elaborate plans to repatriate the refugees back to Burw1di215 
because repatriation is typically favoured over local integration as the most desired "durable 
solution".216 The government continued to deny their applications to be oatu.ralized as 
Tanzanian citizens and their offspring were denied citizenship on account of their birth in 
Tanzania. This led to some form of protracted exile with the refugees facing an imminent threat 
in becoming stateless.217 It was only until 2008 that the Tanzanian government yielded to the 
refugees' pleas and promised them citizenship in a move that lauded the world over as the 
move that would avert a growing crisis that had led to those caught up in its midst effectively 
stateless. 218 
Implementation of the same also became problematic. The Tanzanian government began to see 
bow much their 'open-door' policy was proving to be cumbersome with issues of 
overpopulation and insecurity emanating from the application of unrestricted jus soli hence the 
reluctance to award citizenship.219 Recently, the government ofTanzania acting on orders from 
the president, Mr. Jolm Magufuli, deported Kenyans who bad been living rightfully in 
Tanzania. Kenyan nationals living in the country claim that the exercise, popularly known as 
'Operation Tirnua Wageni', was a move to free up jobs for the locals and it saw scores of 
Kenyan nationals, who were said to be the most targeted, declared prohibited immigrants and 
deported.220 In a rather shocking move, Tanzania informed the United Nations High 
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Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in January of 2018 that it was suspending the granting 
of citizenship to some Burundian refugees and that it would discourage new asylum 
applications. This is after being considered, for the longest time, a safe haven for refugees, 
particularly from Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 22! 
The application of an absolute jus sanguinis regime would also be problematic and many not 
only create but also further statelessness in a country. Kenya is perfect example of how the 
application of the law of descent at the point of state creation made it impossible for 
communities such as Makonde, Nubians and the Kenyan-Asians to obtain guarantees of 
citizenship despite having lived in the country since before independence. The continuous 
application of the law of descent in turn makes statelessness hereditary in that those rendered 
stateless at the point of state succession cannot pass on any citizenship to their descendants. 
In conclusion, it is clear that the two principles cannot apply absolutely and instead need to 
work in tandem for statelessness to be effectively dealt with. AU proper jus soli systems require 
an inclusion of jus sanguinis, subsequently. The introduction of jus sanguinis was a remedy 
for the shortcomings of jus soli and should not be disregarded entirely. 
5.2 Recommendations 
This study makes the fo llowing recommendations: 
In the event that following state creation, populations of non-nationals or aliens are found on a 
particular territory, revocation of citizenship or the expulsion of aliens should follow due 
process and ensure that considerations as to whether the persons would be rendered stateless 
following such an action are included.222 This stance was upheld in a case against Mauritius 
where the state was found to have violated Article 12(5) of the Banjul Charter223 forbidding 
expulsions on the grounds of nationality. 
Internationally accepted norms such as: ensuring all children born in a state obtain citizenship 
of that state if they would otherwise have been rendered stateless, the right to at least one 
nationality of predecessor states in the event of state succession and the prohibition of 
discrimination in the granting of citizenship should be upheld and replicated in municipal laws 
as well. 224 
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National constitutions and nationality Jaws should provide for an explicit and unqualified right 
to a nationality from birth. The law should provide for persons to have a light to nationality 
(whether from the time of birth or by acquisition at a later stage) on the basis of any appropriate 
connection to the country, including birth in the terTitory, having a father or mother (including 
an adoptive father or mother) who is a citizen, marriage to a citizen. or habitual residence. 225 
There should be a provis ion oftbe law allowing for persons to have the right to the documents 
necessary for proving nationality and altemative systems of identification where 
documentation is unavailable or cannot be reasonably obtained. 226 Instances where such 
documentation is withheld, as was in the case of the Nubian children with respect to birth 
certificates, should be made illegal and punitive action taken. 
Finally, policy changes to the laws that were created at the time of state succession should be 
applied in a bid to create a citizenship law regime that is cognisant of the historical, political, 
cultura l, social and economic conditions of the state and its constitt1ents. 
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